Safety review - Emirates flight 407 Mark McIlroy 23 October 2025 1. Emirates flight 407 was a flight from Melbourne to Dubai on 20th March 2009 that overran the runway and almost ended in disaster. This was because the first officer entered a weight of 262 tonnes instead of the actual 362 tonnes for the aircraft weight into the flight calculations. 2. These are my suggestions for safety improvements due to this incident. 3. The flight calculations reported a flaps setting of 1. This is the lowest possible setting. This is despite the fact that the aircraft was 'fully loaded' with almost 300 passengers and crew, and it was a 14 hour flight so they would have been carrying a lot of weight in fuel. The flight procedures should be amended to include a 'reasonableness check' of the settings based on the number of passengers on the aircraft and the amount of fuel on board. 4. There were four people in the cockpit when the pre-flight work was being done. This would make it impossible for the pilots to concentrate properly. There should be a rule that only the two main pilots should be in the cockpit when the pre-flight work is being done. 5. For the same reason as 4., the 'sterile cockpit' rule should apply during the period when the pre-flight work is being done, even if the aircraft is at a gate. 6. There have been a number of accidents and near-misses due to pilots entering the incorrect weight for aircraft takeoff. Planes should have strain gauges in the landing gear to enable them to measure their own weight. 7. 'Flex' is dangerous. It involves intentionally entering incorrect data to the aircraft systems in order to save fuel. If it is used it should be used with extreme caution, not be used for every takeoff or automatically. 8. Flight procedures should be enhanced to include, if an aircraft is not lifting off properly, immediately increase thrust regardless of the intended takeoff parameters. 9. Additional suggestions from other videos: 1. Fuel leaks - a fuel flow rate measure as the fuel line immediately leaves the fuel tank, and right at the end of the fuel line into the engine, to immediately detect fuel leaks if the flow rates don't match. This detection could take minutes instead of waiting hours to detect fuel remaining being too low. 2. Checklists when things go wrong should be followed not reviewed and then ignored. In one close call the checklist for suspected fuel leak said to shut down the affected engine and land immediately, however the pilots did neither of these things. 3. Checklists are not perfect. Example, in one fuel leak scenario resulting in a fuel imbalance, the procedure was to open the cross-flow valve. However if fuel was leaking from one side then this would just result in all fuel being lost not half of it. 4. Apparently computer system incorrect readings are common but the default position should be to believe the values the computer is reporting. Computer readings that seem impossible do not necessarily mean a computer error, often later it is found that the readings were correct. 5. Causes of crashes: - Maintenance error (often the wrong part being fitted). - Design fault (tailplane too small/in wrong position for good airflow, pipes too close together). - Pilot error (entering wrong aircraft weight, flight path co-ordinates etc). - Problem at the airport (contaminated fuel, short runway etc). - Air traffic control error (plane collision, wrong/no information given to pilots etc). - Situation exacerbated by bad weather. - Poor procedures, e.g. pilot procedures, air traffic control procedures leading to situations where an accident is almost inevitable. - Poor quality software in the aircraft control systems. - Pressure on pilots from airlines to avoid actions that would incur costs and to keep the plane flying. - Combination of several of these. - People allowed into positions of safety who do not have the right personality and attitude to life for those positions. Examples of personality types unsuitable to be commercial pilots or air-traffic controllers: - too quiet and timid - overconfident and prone to showing off - reckless and risk-taking - lazy Suitable types - level-headed and normal personality, professional attitude and activities. 6. It's an unfortunate situation that aircraft manufacturers and airlines that are short of money will sometimes cut corners which will affect safety. This situation should be clearly recognised so that the results can be avoided. 7. It's absolutely critical to be clear about who's job each task is. Several accidents have happened because person A thought person B had done a task, while person B thought that person A had done it. 8. Lack of common sense in system design. For example, in the case of Turkish flight 6491 the autoland system had a feature where, if the radio signal was unreliable, it would default to a 3% descent slope. If the radio signal was erratic, the aircraft would descend on a 3% slope until it crashed right into the ground, which is exactly what happened. (The pilots received a warning but the autopilot continued to fly the plane right into the ground). This is terriable design, if the radio signal was erratic for more than a short period then the descent should have been cancelled. 9. Try to design hardware and software systems that don't produce a lot of false warnings. In an environment where a large number of warnings are issued: - Warnings tend to be downgraded to not being important. - There is a high workload to check all the warnings and some might be missed. - However be careful not to suppress real warnings for this reason. B. Repeated accidents Issues that have caused more than one accident, repeating issues: 1. Incorrect amount of fuel loaded, due to misunderstanding of units (pounds/kilograms etc). 2. Pitot tubes blocked or covered, no airspeed indication. This function is so critical that aircraft should have a sensor that can check on the ground that the pitot tube is clear. 3. Burst/damaged fuel pipe/flange leading to fuel leak. 4. Mid-air collisions.